increased in 1960s, there was "a landmark shift in the relationship between these two sectors" (Kramer, 1981, p. 68) . Studies indicate that the partnership between government and human service nonprofits has evolved to the point that the federal government is now a primary funding source of nonprofit activities (Froelich, 1999; Gronbjerg, 1993; Salamon, 1995) .
Although relationships have evolved over time, the empirical studies attempting to identify mechanisms governing the government-nonprofit relationship are essentially static. These studies do not take into account how the relationship has changed over time. There have been no attempts to study this relationship dynamically. In this article, we initiate development of a dynamic resource theory to map the process of interdependence between government and human service nonprofits and hypothesize key mechanisms governing this relationship. The first step in developing this theory is accomplished by combining assumptions of system dynamics with resource dependence theory. Although there are different levels of governments and different types of human service nonprofits, we focus generally on the aggregate of government and human service nonprofits. Throughout this article, the term government support or funding refers to government contracts and grants.
The article consists of five parts. First, we present the need for dynamic theory to understand and guide the government-nonprofit relationship, especially paying attention to resource dependence theory. Second, we describe basic assumptions of system dynamics useful to examine the governmentnonprofit human service delivery. Third, we show how dynamic resource theory can resolve four of the limitations pointed out by critics of resource dependence theory. Fourth, we provide an illustration of dynamic resource theory, focusing on the levels of service quality resulting from the government-nonprofit relationship. Last, we point out the policy and research implications of a dynamic resource theory and conclude with recommendations for testing and refining dynamic resource theory.
NEED FOR DYNAMIC RESOURCE THEORY
Resource dependence theory seeks to explain interorganizational relationships through the exchange of critical resources and power imbalances of the exchange process (Johnson, 1998) . The theory assumes that organizations are not able to produce all the resources needed and, therefore, interact with other organizations that control the needed resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) . The control of resources draws attention to the distribution and use of power between organizations. The theory highlights power dependency or the asymmetrical nature of exchange relationships (Emerson, 1962) . Salamon (1995) pointed out that "the voluntary sector's weaknesses correspond well with government's strengths, and vice versa" (p. 48). Government and human service nonprofits voluntarily enter into exchange relationships to gain the resources needed to achieve their goals. Government, lacking direct service delivery capability, seeks nonprofits that have this capacity. Nonprofits, lacking financial capital, seek government funding to help meet service delivery goals; that is, both of them are to some degree mutually dependent. Saidel (1991) illustrates the relationship between government and nonprofits from a resource dependence perspective (see Figure 1 ). Resources flow from government to nonprofits and vice versa. In this process, the degree of dependency is determined by the importance of the resource, the availability of alternatives, and the ability to compel provision of the resource (Saidel, p. 545 ). Saidel's (1991) diagram offers a feedback representation of the resource exchange process; however, this illustration fails to convey the dynamic nature of the feedback process. There is no specification of how the relationship has evolved. Similarly, the literature on resource dependence has described the relationship at a given point in time, rather than showing how the relationship changes over time (Johnson, 1998) . However, interdependent relationships evolve over time, and the distribution of power in those relationships can also shift from one side to the other. Exchange is an ongoing interaction-driven process, and the interaction is fueled by information. According to Forrester (1961) "an information-feedback system exists whenever the environment leads to a decision that results in action which affects the environment and thereby influences future decisions" (p. 14). As Gillespie (2000) illustrated, the concept of information feedback is essential to understand how decisions are made and how actions are taken because decision makers take actions based on information that is available.
In addition, Saidel's (1991) diagram fails to include the recipients of services, which represent the main reason for the government-nonprofit relationship. Meeting the needs of citizens, customers, or clients (service recipients) is important to the government and nonprofits, as both of them enter into exchange relationships to pursue their respective goals. Figure 2 includes service recipients and elaborates the information feedback links to better illustrate the process of human service delivery between government, human service nonprofits, and service recipients.
As Figure 2 indicates, each of the sectors has certain needs. Service recipients have unmet needs and thus seek services. The government, obligated to respond to the needs of its citizens, publishes requests for proposals to deliver services meeting their needs. Nonprofits, unable to fully meet the needs or demand for services in their communities because of financial constraints, respond to government requests for proposals with programs designed to meet peoples' needs. The government provides funds to agencies determined to have the capacity to deliver the needed services. The nonprofits that are funded then deliver services in accordance with government program guidelines. To help ensure accountability, the government requires funded nonprofits to adhere to specified guidelines and regulations. Nonprofits provide periodic reports to the government to show that they are working within the guidelines and regulations. In addition, nonprofits elicit feedback on the quality of services from service recipients. Although resource dependence theory recognizes feedback loops in the government and nonprofit relationship, it fails to describe the variables and relationships making up these feedback loops and, therefore, is unable to account for the dynamic behavior of this relationship. This is a critical weakness because these feedback loops are the primary determinants of behavior in social and economic systems (Forrester, 1968) . A direct focus on the dynamics of resource exchange, therefore, is the basis for a potentially fruitful theory.
ASSUMPTIONS FROM SYSTEM DYNAMICS
Dynamic resource theory is conceived from the application of system dynamics to dependencies arising through the process of resource exchange. These dependencies are implied but not specified by resource dependence theory. We found system dynamics to be very useful in augmenting this theory.
System dynamics was developed by Jay W. Forrester based on ideas from three disciplines: (a) the concepts of feedback and self-regulation from control engineering, (b) the role of information in control systems from cybernetics, and (c) the structure of organizations and decision making from organizational theory (Meadows & Robinson, 1985, p. 27) . System dynamics has been misinterpreted by some as conceptualizing social systems in a deterministic or mechanistic way, which is not correct (Lane, 2001) . Rather, taking a functionalist systems perspective, it views systems as objective and independent of those observing it (Jackson, 2000, p. 107) . Lane (2001) noted system dynamics has the potential to posit "a grand theory about the existence of objective causal laws in social systems" (p. 109). Integrating certain assumptions of system dynamics with the assumptions of resource dependence theory initiates what we are calling dynamic resource theory, a potentially powerful framework for understanding and guiding the government-nonprofit relationship.
System dynamics puts special emphasis on the feedback loops operating in a system. Feedback loops are characterized as closed paths of action and information (Richardson & Pugh, 1981, p. 4) . From a system dynamics perspective, the modes of behavior of the system are generated by the interaction of system components within a causally closed boundary (Forrester, 1968) ; that is, key variables are interrelated through feedback loops within causally closed but materially open systems (Richardson, 1991, pp. 297-298) . There are two kinds of feedback loops: reinforcing (or positive) feedback loops and balancing (or negative) feedback loops. Reinforcing feedback loops lead to accelerating growth or decay (e.g., virtuous or vicious circles) whereas balancing feedback loops underlies goal-seeking behaviors (e.g., body temperature). Thus, when theorizing about a specific problem of the government-nonprofit relationship, all relevant variables related to the problem are incorporated as endogenous in the model to describe the dynamic behavior of the system (Forrester, 1968) .
System dynamics explicitly includes time in specifying dynamic relationships. In reality, an action and its impacts on the system do not happen simultaneously. System dynamics allows for the inclusion of time delays between an action and its consequences on the state of the system (Sterman, 2000) . The concept of time delays is crucial to accurately understand the governmentnonprofit relationships. For instance, as government funding increased so did the regulations to ensure accountability of service delivery (Smith & Lipsky, 1993) . Over time, these regulations resulted in negative consequences among certain human service nonprofits (Froelich, 1999; Gronbjerg, 1993) . In this context, it is essential to understand how relationships evolve over time because it can take several years to observe the unanticipated consequences resulting from government funding for service delivery.
POTENTIAL OF DYNAMIC RESOURCE THEORY
The merit of dynamic resource theory is that it resolves four of the criticisms of traditional resource dependence theory. First, resource dependence theory ignores the goals that actors pursue in the interaction process (Hall, 1991) . Dynamic resource theory includes the goals sought by each party in the exchange process. Goals are essential to understand the governmentnonprofit relationship because organizations always have a purpose for obtaining resources. Without consideration of goals, the relationship tends to be highly abstract or vague as reflected in Saidel's (1991) conception illustrated above.
Second, the research on resource dependence theory ignores organizational sets, for example, the possibility of alliances among nonprofits (Galaskiewicz, 1985) . Dynamic resource theory accommodates sets of actors in explaining the exchange process. For instance, coalitions or alliances can be included when it is believed or empirically established that they influence the government-nonprofit relationship.
Third, resource dependence researchers have not fully considered the effects of institutional environments on the decision-making process (Galaskiewicz, 1985) . Dynamic resource theory can take into account the effects of environmental constraints on decision making. Institutional variations (e.g., changes in law) and political environments (e.g., shifts in societal priorities) do influence the choices available to decision makers. Dynamic resource theory incorporates variables representing these environments into the model.
Last and most important, resource dependence theory does not explicitly deal with the dynamics of the feedback loops driving government-nonprofit relations, which are essential for understanding the continuously evolving relationship. Dynamic resource theory seeks to understand the dominant feedback loops driving government-nonprofit relations for human service delivery. From the dynamic perspective, the interrelations of positive and negative feedback loops generate various kinds of behavior patterns over time. Without careful deliberation of the feedback loops operating in the government-nonprofit relationship, it is almost impossible to fully capture how the relationship works over time and solve problems emerging from the relationship (Gillespie, 2000) .
Summing up, the flexibility of dynamic resource theory in specifying goals, alliances, environmental constraints, and feedback loops opens new possibilities for a deeper understanding of the government-nonprofit relationship.
AN ILLUSTRATION OF DYNAMIC RESOURCE THEORY
As illustrated in Figure 2 above, government-nonprofit human service delivery is a complex and dynamic process, involving government agencies, nonprofits, and service recipients. The government publicly claims its purpose in funding nonprofits is to increase service quality, and in accepting government funding nonprofits also claim that their purpose is to increase quality. However, because governments traditionally use regulations to set minimum standards of quality, it is unlikely that government funding serves as an incentive to substantively improve service quality. Some evidence suggests that service quality is hampered by government funding. For example, a study examining 2,965 human service contracts in New York City found that nonprofits complained of poor quality services because of an overemphasis on fiscal accountability by government (Interface, 1986) . Other evidence indicates that the level of services quality improves because of financial stability (Deming, 1986) .
It is clear that increasing the quality of services is a complicated dynamic problem entailing feedback loops of the relationships between government, nonprofits, and service recipients. To illustrate dynamic resource theory, we focus on how quality of service changes over time in the government-nonprofit human service delivery system. Although there are many dimensions of service quality, we follow Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry (1990) in emphasizing service reliability because this is what service recipients value most. Service reliability is the probability that a service will be delivered in a dependable and consistent manner with minimal variation over time or across service recipients (Feigenbaum, 1991) .
Although the government-nonprofit relationship has existed throughout history, we focus on the past 40+ years, 1960 to the present. In dynamic resource theory, the time horizon needs to be carefully selected to adequately frame a dynamic problem of interest. This 40+ year time horizon was selected for the following reasons. First, we picked 1960 as the starting point because government support to nonprofits dramatically increased during the 1960s. Second, we believe that the 40-year period is long enough to capture the operation of the feedback loops governing the level of service quality within the government-nonprofit human service delivery system.
From a historical point of view, the government-nonprofit relationship changes in response to policy initiatives and political leadership (Froelich, 1999) . The government-nonprofit relationship dramatically increased in 1960s. The Johnson administration (1963 -1969 started to boost nonprofits through its Great Society programs and the Nixon administration (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) continued expanding government support to nonprofits in the 1970s. However, the Reagan administration (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) reduced drastically the budgets for government support to nonprofits (Close Up Foundation, 1998; De Vita, 1999) . Federal budget cuts continued in the 1990s. The 1995 House budget resolution on the nonprofit sector projected that if the proposal were fully executed, nonprofits would have a U.S.$125 billion gap in their revenues in fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, the total gap would amount to a $254 billion in their revenue during the fiscal years 1996 through 2002 (Hodgkinson, Pollak, & Salamon, 1995) .
Here we describe how the government-nonprofit relationship and quality of service are interrelated during the past 40+ years. As perception of government responsiveness to service demand decreased, government spending for service delivery increased (Seaberg & Gillespie, 1974) . As government spending on social welfare programs increased, government expenditures to nonprofits or government contracts with nonprofits also increased (Lipsky & Smith, 1990) . For the government, funding facilitates the provision of services to meet the needs of citizens. For the nonprofits, government funding represents a dependable flow of revenue. Increased stability in revenue flow facilitates the provision of higher quality services (Deming, 1986) .
On the other hand, the government imposes accountability requirements on nonprofits to ensure program accountability for the funding provided (Lewis, 1985; Smith, 1996) . These requirements are designed to yield positive consequences, specifically to improve program accountability and ultimately the quality of service (Schwandt & Halpern, 1988) . According to resource dependence theory, negative consequences are more likely to manifest in the exchange partner that has less power. Because the government has institutional control over nonprofits through the federal tax code and the regulations associated with government funds, dynamic resource theory anticipates that negative consequences will more often initially surface in nonprofits than in the government. The literature also suggests several nonprofit negative consequences emerging from the government-nonprofit contracts: (a) dilution of the advocacy role (Salamon, 1987) , (b) goal displacement (Bernstein, 1991; Liebschutz, 1992) , (c) loss of autonomy (Gronbjerg, 1993) , (d) increase in overhead costs (Gronbjerg, 1990) , and (e) poor quality services from an overemphasis on fiscal accountability (Interface, 1986) .
To better understand the whole process of the government-nonprofit service delivery, we provide a case example of dynamic resource theory applied to the government-nonprofit relationship. As a first step in this application, we created a causal loop diagram showing how the quality of service changes over time in the government-nonprofit human service delivery system. In this diagram, we focus on the major feedback loops driving the quality of service. As illustrated in Figure 3 , the relationship revolves around the quality of service, defined as service reliability (Zeithaml et al., 1990) .
There are six feedback loops driving the quality of service and balance of power between government and nonprofits. Five of these feedback loops (R1, R2, R3, B1, and B2) indicate how the level of service quality is improved or lowered (quality dynamics) whereas one feedback loop (B3) suggests how power dynamics between government and nonprofits work in the system (power dynamics).
The two feedback loops labeled R1 and B1 show how the quality of service improves or deteriorates over time, depending on the gap between the quality standards and the actual level of service quality. These two loops share several of the same variables and relationships: quality of services, gap between actual level of service quality and standards, pressure to close the gap, and government regulations. In R1, as shown in Figure 3 , the relationship between quality of service and the gap between quality standards and actual level of service quality is negative-as service quality goes up the gap closes or as service quality goes down the gap widens. As the gap widens, the pressure to close it increases. For example, the government can threaten to withdraw funds. Under normal operating conditions, the government requires nonprofits to comply with its standards, that is, to close the gap. However, as revealed in the figure, government regulations have two opposite impacts on service quality: positive and negative. In R1, as the number or restrictiveness of the regulations increases, the probability of negative consequences rises over time from problems in implementing the standards. This suggests a delay in the negative consequences arising from complications with the standards. This delay is symbolized in Figure 3 with double slash marks (//) through the causal arrow from government regulations to nonprofit negative consequences. These consequences then eventually reduce service quality. Because the number of negative relationships in this feedback loop is even, R1 is a reinforcing feedback loop.
Balancing loop B1 is the same as R1 from quality of services through government regulations. The difference between B1 and R1 is in the consequences from government regulations. As illustrated in Figure 3 , increasing government regulations contributes to a rise in the number of nonprofit positive consequences. These positive consequences stem from the incremental increases in the quality standards established through the government regulations. Standards tend to rise in a staircase pattern incrementally over time as knowledge and experience is gained and refinements are made (Seaberg & Gillespie, 1974) . These positive consequences enhance service quality. There is no real delay in the impact of the positive consequences because the nonprofits are made aware of the standards in writing proposals for government funding. Because the number of negative relationships in this feedback loop is odd, B1 is a balancing feedback loop.
The feedback loops labeled R2 and B2 specify how the quality of service increases or decreases, depending on the perceptions of government responsiveness to service demand. Reinforcing loop R2 and balancing loop B2 overlap with two loops Rl and B1 described above in that they all operate through government regulations, nonprofit negative consequences, and nonprofit positive consequences.
In R2, as shown in Figure 3 , a change in the quality of service causes a change in the perceptions of government responsiveness to service demandsincreasing quality of services leads to perceptions of increasing government responsiveness or decreasing quality of services leads to perceptions of decreasing government responsiveness. The perception of government responsiveness, in turn, is negatively related to government spending on service delivery. We also hypothesize that government spending on service delivery is related positively to the amount of government expenditures contracted with nonprofits. Increasing government spending on service delivery increases the likelihood that nonprofits will compete for these funds. Although for-profit firms will also compete for these funds, the tax advantages allowed to nonprofits have historically provided an edge that supports the positive relationship between government spending and government expenditures to nonprofits. Increasing expenditures to nonprofits causes the government to impose more regulations on nonprofits. As discussed above with R1, after a period of time, these regulations result in some negative consequences for the nonprofits. Again, this is represented in Figure 3 with the delay symbol on the causal arrow from government regulations to nonprofit negative consequences. As in the case of R1, this eventually leads to lower quality.
Balancing loop B2 is the same as R2 from quality of services through government regulations. The difference between B2 and R2 is in the consequences from government regulations. As drawn in Figure 3 , increasing government regulations contributes to increasing nonprofit positive consequences. Again, these consequences stem from improvements in the quality standards governed by government regulations. Although these improvements tend to be minimal, over time they enhance service quality. As noted above, the impact of positive consequences is relatively immediate because the nonprofits incorporate the standards or prepare to adopt them when writing proposals for government funding.
The last two feedback loops to be discussed-R3 and B3-contribute to changing the system, first by increasing the minimum standards of service quality over time and second by balancing power in the relationship between government and nonprofits. Similar to the preceding four loops, reinforcing loop R3 and balancing loop B3 share some of the same variables and relationships.
Reinforcing loop R3 explains the rise in quality standards over time. A change in government regulations is positively related to the level of standards set by the government-increasing regulations raises the minimum level of standards or decreasing regulations lowers the minimum level of standards. As noted above, there is a historical tendency for standards to increase incrementally over time, which widens the gap between the standards and the actual level of service quality. This widening of the gap between standards and actual service quality increases the pressure to close the gap. This pressure is positively related to government regulations. Closing the standards-quality gap serves to maintain the standards at the current level, except that there is a delay that results in overshooting and undershooting the target level of standards in the government regulations. This creates an oscillating pattern in the quality of service over time. Failure to close the standards-quality gap results in regulatory changes to the standards. Again, the delay between pressure to close the gap and government regulations causes an oscillatory pattern in service quality.
Balancing loop B3 indicates how power can shift over time in the government-nonprofit relationship. As government regulations increase, nonprofit negative consequences increase with a delay and then level off. As a working hypothesis drawn from informal conversations with managers at a local nonprofit organization, we hypothesize that nonprofit negative consequences emerge about 2 to 3 years after changes in the government regulations. As a result of these negative consequences, the nonprofits begin to form alliances to advocate for changes favorable to their operation. Without any hard data, we believe that over the course of about 3 to 5 years the nonprofit alliances will succeed in helping to modify the standards published through government regulations. These modifications reduce the negative consequences experienced by the nonprofits.
Although we have discussed each feedback loop tangent to each other in pairs, it is important to understand that dynamic resource theory is the mutually interacting set of all six feedback loops evolving together over time. The level of service quality at any point in time depends on the relative dominance of one or more of the reinforcing feedback loops (R1, R2, and R3) or the balancing feedback loops (B1, B2, and B3). Typically, the balancing feedback loops are dominant. However, periodically one or more of the reinforcing feedback loops R1, R2, or R3 become dominant in the system. It is the temporary dominance of a reinforcing feedback loop that sparks change in the system. For example, the dominance of the R1 reinforcing feedback loop will cause the level of service quality to fall below the minimum standards, and this triggers pressure to close the gap, causing reallocation of resources to remedy the problem. In the worse-case scenario the standards are lowered to be consistent with the level of service quality. In the best-case scenario the standards are continuously raised to eventually help push up the level of service quality. The level of quality considered acceptable is governed by the balancing feedback loops. These loops are goal-seeking feedback loops. They operate to ensure that service quality plays out in the system within a determined range.
The dynamic complexity arising from the interaction of these six feedback loops makes it extremely difficult to understand the government-nonprofit relationship and manage service quality. Government regulations can produce different consequences depending on the nature of the changes made in the standards and the balance of power between the government and nonprofits. This is an ongoing dynamic process with significant delays. In this process, intersecting feedback loops around the quality of service create a dynamically complex structure that is continuously evolving to meet the needs of service recipients, for better or worse.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The government and nonprofits are mutually dependent in delivering human services. The government contracts with nonprofits to implement service programs and creates standards to help ensure a minimum level of service quality. Human service nonprofits that accept government funds must comply with the standards promulgated through the regulations. Although these standards are designed to increase the quality of service, which for the most part they have accomplished, historically they have also caused negative consequences in a certain number of cases. The appearance of these negative consequences inspires nonprofits to join forces and form alliances to seek ways of mitigating the negative consequences. These alliances represent a mechanism for balancing the power between the government and nonprofits. In mutually dependent relationships, it is critical that the balance of power be approximately equal. The consequence of domination by one actor reduces effectiveness, with ancillary costs of conflict, delays, and errors (Alter & Hage, 1993, p. 79) . Because the balance of power is never exactly equal, empirically we expect the balance of power to shift back and forth over time.
Time delays in the feedback loops of the government-nonprofit relationship draw attention to another policy implication. It takes a fairly long period of time for the consequences of a standard or regulation to emerge. In an attempt to close the apparent discrepancies between the standards and actual levels of service quality, policy makers often make too many interventions because they do not take into consideration the time lags between their interventions and the consequences of those interventions (Sterman, 2000) . In the government-nonprofit relationship, policy makers claim to be seeking ways to improve service quality, which leads to more and more regulations or refinements in the standards that help guide the work of nonprofits. As noted above, feedback from nonprofit alliances can help to clarify how negative consequences manifest from a particular standard or regulation.
The standards in government regulations are often written broadly to apply across categories of program activities. This ignores the wide variation of organizational environments, structures, and processes even within a particular type such as community-based social service organizations. Gronbjerg's (1993) case studies illustrate a wide range of environmental constraints and organizational contingencies. It is critical that these constraints and contingencies be taken into account when creating standards to govern the quality of service delivery. This implies an imperative for nonprofits to seek to shape the regulations through advocacy efforts when new standards are proposed or old standards revised. In addition, because environmental constraints and organizational contingencies are continuously evolving, it is desirable to create standards that are paradoxically robust and adaptable as circumstances change.
To improve the quality of service, there is first a need to write guidelines that protect nonprofits from governmental interference, while ensuring the legitimate right of government to account for the programs it supports (Smith & Lipsky, 1993, p. 13 ). This will help minimize nonprofit negative consequences and in the long run increase quality of service. Second, the focus of government standards needs to shift from the evaluation of administrative processes to evaluation of program processes (Smith, 1996) . Third, nonprofits need to build their internal capacity to minimize possible negative consequences resulting from evolving government standards. This might include restructuring to lower overhead and administrative costs and expanding entrepreneurial capacity to secure the human and physical resources (Austin, 2003) . Fourth, participation of community organizations in nonprofit alliances can expand capacity to attract government contracts and increase leverage in dealing with the government (Alter & Hage, 1993) .
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
The dynamics underlying the government-nonprofit relationship is a complex process of dynamically interacting multiple factors evolving over time. Resource dependence theory provides useful insights on the resource exchange relationships between government and nonprofits but overlooks several important points regarding dynamic relationships; that is, the theory fails to capture how the dynamics of the relationships work over time.
Cast within the system dynamics paradigm, dynamic resource theory offers useful guidelines for the elaboration and testing of relationships over a period of time. The dynamic theory overcomes the major shortcomings of resource dependence theory and deals with the methodological weaknesses shown in the empirical studies on government-nonprofit relationship. It guides specification of the structure governing the dynamics of government-nonprofit relations over time. This structure, among other things, incorporates feedback loops and time delays operating in the system. Dynamic resource theory offers a powerful approach to understand such a complex dynamic process.
Because this is a first step toward dynamic resource theory, there is an immediate need for thorough specification and testing of the theory. The causal loop diagram helps us understand how the government and nonprofit relationship affects the quality of service; however, such diagrams lack precision (Richardson, 1986) . Causal loop diagrams are most frequently employed at the early stage of model conceptualization or at the end of a research study (Richardson & Pugh, 1981) . The next phase of development must carefully map the interdependencies between the facets of government support and attributes of nonprofit operations. To test the theory, simulation models with explicit equations capturing the mapped structure and timeseries data are needed (Richardson & Pugh, 1981) . Dynamic modelers will also need to operationally define the variables (Jacobsen & Bronson, 1987) , gather time-series data or estimates of time-based parameters (Ostrom, 1990) , and have specified relationships between variables in the model (Sterman, 2000) .
In addition, to expand our understanding of the relationships between each pair of variables hypothesized in the dynamic resource theory, detailed research will need to document the extent and duration of these relationships. For example, previous studies are limited to static descriptions and one or another of the reported negative impacts from government funding. It is crucial that we understand not only the mechanisms that initiate these consequences but also the character of the agencies that suffer the most severe negative consequences, the developmental pattern of these consequences as they unfold over time, and the most useful leverage points to mitigate these effects from the otherwise beneficial aspects of government funding. Finding these kinds of mechanisms will help us locate leverage points to increase quality of service.
